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Hyman: Substantial Performance of Builder's Contracts
SUBSTANT[AL PERFORMANCE OF BUILDER'S
CONTRAGTS
The purpose of this undertaking is to set forth the-problems encountered when dealing with substantial performance of builders'
contracts, what the courts have done about them and a suggested
course to be followed on the undecided questions in South Carolina.
An owner or lessee of land decides to build a house and contracts
with a builder for its erection. They place a set of conditions and
specifications in a contract. The builder agrees to comply with the
specifications and the owner in turn agrees to pay accordingly. While
ordinarily such promises would be dependent' and full performance
by the builder a condition of recovery, the rule has been relaxed in
reference to builders' contracts. 2 Generally the contracts provide
for payment as follows: "Final payment shall be due ......
days after
substantial completion of the works, provided the work be then fully
completed and the contract fully performed." 3 Here performance
is made a condition precedent to payment of the contract price. According to the rule of common law, performance as a condition precedent to a recovery on the contract must be strict performance in
accordance with the terms of the contract,4 and good faith and substantial performance are not enough.5 The rule has been relaxed
in South Carolina as elsewhere so that where there has been substantial performance of the contract by one party, which is of benefit to the
other and the benefits are retained by him, there may be a recovery
of the contract price by the party substantially performing just as
in the case of strict performance, but the recovery is subject to the
right of the other party to recoup the damages occasioned to him by
the defects in the performance.6
SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE DErINED

The perplexing thing in the contract is the appearance of the phrase
substantialperformance. What is this mythical gem substantial performance? To determine what the phrase means an exploration of
1. 2 WnxIsToN, CONTRACTS §§ 816-818.
2. Leonard v. Peoples Tobacco Warehouse Co., 128 S.C. 155, 178 S. E. 678
(1924).
3. ARTicLE V STANDARD BUILDERs CONTRACT /IMRICAN INSTITUTE or ARcmTUcTs.

4. 13 C.J. 690.
5. 17 C. J. S. 1085.
6. Leonard v. Peoples Tobacco Warehouse Co., supra.
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several definitions is necessary. Substantial performance generally
means not doing the exact thing promised, but doing something
else that is just as good, or good enough for obligor and obligee.7
However, in building contracts substantial performance is not full
performance in every slight or unimportant detail but performance
of all important particulars.8 "Substantial performance exists where
there has been no wilful departure from the terms of the contract,
and no omission in essential points and the contract has been honestly and faithfully performed in its material and substantial particulars,
and the only variance from the strict and literal performance consists
of technical or unimportant omissions or defects." 9 Substantial performance has been defined by the New York courts as full contract
performance, the deviation being of a minor, unimportant, inadvertent and unintentional character. 10
WHAT CONSTITUTES

SUBSTANTIAL PROORMANC"?

No rigid rule can be laid down as to whether a particular situation comes within the doctrine of substantial performance. The doctrine of substantial performance of contract is intended for the
protection and relief of those who faithfully and honestly endeavor
to perform their contracts in all material and substantial particulars,
so that their right to compensation may not be forfeited because of a
mere technical, inadvertent or unimportant omission or defect. It
is incumbent upon the person invoking the doctrine to present a
case in which it is proved that there has been no wilful omission
or departure from the terms of the contract.1n In considering the
matter Justice Cardozo has said, "We must weigh the purpose to be
served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for the deviation from
the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence. Then only can we tell
'12
whether literal fulfilment is to be implied by law as a condition.
An early South Carolina case (1844) where there was an omission
to put up a privy, because of the deficiency of space, and the owner
expressed his gratification that the contractor had performed his work
so well, this evidence in behalf of the contractor was sufficient for
the jury to infer that the omissions were waived, and therefore the
7. 17 C. J. S. 1086.
8. 17 C. J. S. 1089.
9. BL-ACKs LAW DIcTIONARY, 3rd Ed. 1671.
10. WOLFE, SUBSTANTIAL PERFORAIANCE OF CONTRAcs IiN NEW YORK

16

Cornell L. Q. 180 (1930) ; Note, Substantial Performance of Builders Contracts
in New York 31 Coi- L. REv. 307 (1931).
l1. Morgan v. Gamble, et al., 230 Pa. 165, 79 A. 410 (1911).
12. Jacob & Young v. Kent, 230 N. Y. 239, 129 N. E. 889, 891 (1921).
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contract was accepted as complete. 13 Several years later in considering an action of covenant to recover the price of building a house,
the court said, "the plaintiff is not bound to shew that he had hung
every window shutter right, and that he had placed to exactness every
mantel; he cannot be non-suited, if he shews, generally, that the work
was done, or that the defendant expressed himself satisfied therewith."14
Where a contractor used iron pipe where the contract called for
lead pipe for the water system, the owner was allowed to recover
damages because such a substitution was not considered within the
doctrine of substantial performance. In the same case, where Princess' Metallic paint was used in the place of Acme anti-rust paint
as specified by the contract, even though the substituted paint was
just as good, it was held that the builder was not relieved from his
duty to perform the express stipulations of the contract, and his performance was not substantial. 15 In another case a contract required:
"All wrought iron pipe must be well galvanized, lap welded pipe of
the grade known as 'standard pipe' of Reading manufacture." Instead a pipe which was of Cohoes manufacture was used, the Cohoes
pipe in every way being the same as the -Reading pipe except for
the name. This was held to be substantial performance for the
reason that the omission was trivial and innocent.1 6 Where cracks,
which could be repaired by cleaning and filling with mortar, were
found in the walls of a completed building but which did not in any
way weaken the structure, it was held to be sufficient to come within
the doctrine of substantial performance. 17 Early in South Carolina,
while considering the question of substantial performance, the court,
citing the ancient case of Boone v. Eyre,' 8 stated that question was
strictly one for the jury, and that even where the plaintiff had performed only one-half of what he convenanted to do, it was deemed
a substantial performance.' 9 In a later South Carolina case the
owner complained that the builder had not placed "crickets" to turn
the water from the skylights, when in fact the builder used another
13. Tappan and Noble v. Harwood, 2 Speers 536 (S. C. 1844).
14. Killian v. Herndon, 4 Rich. Law 609 (S. C. 1851).
15. Morgan v. Gamble, mepra.
16. Jacob & Young v. Kent, supra.

17. Graves v. Allert & Fuess, 104 Tex. 614, 142 S. W. 869 (1912).
18. Where mutual covenants go to the whole of the consideration on both
sides, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other. But where
they only go to a part, such that the breach may be paid for in damages, there
the defendant has a remedy on his covenant. Boone v. Byre, 1 H. Blackstone
273 (1777). The question of whether there has been substantial performance
of the contract shall go to the jury. Ibid.
19. Tappan and Noble v. Harwood, supra.
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method that did the job just as well. The court held that the evidence tended to show that the building was substantially completed
and therefore the question was one for the jury.20 From the preceding cases it is readily discernible that the primary basis in determining whether substantial performance has been rendered depends upon the peculiar factual situation and should be submitted
to a jury.
DAMAGES

Although it is very generally held that proof of substantial performance of a building contract will permit a recovery in an action
on the contract, it is obvious that the contractor should not be permitted to recover the full contract price as though he had exactly
performed unless the owner has accepted the work and thereby
waived full performance.2 1 The fundamental principle which underlies the decisions regarding the measure of damages for defects or
omissions in the performance of a building or construction contract
is that the party is entitled to have what he contracts for, or its
equivalent. 22 In general where a substantial portion of the work
must be done over and the contractor would be deprived of adequate
compensation, the damage allowable to the owner is the amount which
the building would have been worth if constructed in entire conformity to the contract, less the amount that it was worth by reason of
the defects.2 3 In a majority of jurisdictions, where the defects are
such that they may be remedied without the destruction of any substantial part of the benefit which the owner's property has received
by reason of the contractor's work, the amount which the owner
may recover is the cost of making the work conform to the contract.24
There are two theories upon which damages are awarded to the owner where a contract is substantially, but not exactly, performed. The
first is that the damages should be measured by the difference between the value of the property in its defective condition and its value
if it had been completed in compliance with the contract.23
The
second is that the measure of damages is the costs and expenses
reasonably necessary to make the work conform to the contract, on
the principle that the party is entitled to work such as contracted for.2 6
20. Leonard v. Peoples Tobacco Warehouse Co., mipra.
21. Jacob & Young v. Kent, suepra, see Note 23 A. L. R. 1435.
22. 9 Am. Jur. 89.
23. Jacob & Young v. Kent, supra.
24. 9 Am. Jur. 89.
25. Twitty v. McGuire, 7 N. C. 501 (1819).
26. Leathers v. Sweeney, 41 La. Ann. 287, 5 So. 662 (1899), to remedy the
defects in a boat, the damages were the reasonable amount necessary to place
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The majority view follows the second theory where the defects are
27
such that no major part of the construction has to be done over.
However, where the contractor's failure was intentional the owner is
entitled to the cost of making the work conform to such specifications,
and not merely the difference between the value of the property if
the construction had been performed in accordance with the contract
and the value as it now stands.28 As to recovery by the contractor
for the work actually performed, some courts even go so far as to
completely bar recovery regardless of the presence or absence of intent to obtain an advantage, where there is an intentional departure
or deviation from the contract, or a wilful default in the performance
29
of a substantial stipulation.
OCCUPANCY AND USt AS A WAIVER ov DEFECTS

When a builder has completed a building and the owner moves in
and takes possession, the question arises whether the owner has accepted the work and thereby waived any defects contained in the
building. The position has been taken in several jurisdictions that
mere occupation and use of a building is sufficient to show acceptance of performance, and will waive non-performance of certain
stipulations. According to the weight of authority the mere occupancy and use do not constitute an acceptance of the work as complying with the contract, nor amount to a waiver of the defects
therein.30 When the owner has knowledge of the defect in a building,

the boat in proper condition as contemplated by the contract. Where there was

a defective grantholic floor, damages were the amount that it would reasonably
take to make the floor conform to the contract. Lambert v. Jenkins, 112 Va.
379, 71 S. E. 718 (1911). Where there was a deviation from the terms of the
contract in Morgan v. Gamble, supra; such that iron pipe was substituted for
lead pipe and a paint different from that specified was used, the owner was
allowed to recover the cost of conforming the work to the contract. In Jacob
& Young v. Kent, supra, where lap-welded pipe was required by the contract,
the pipe used was lap-welded but was not made by the company specified, the
owner was allowed to.deduct from the sum set out in the contract the amount
required to make the work conform to the contract. In Moss v. Best Knitting
Mills, 190 N. C. 644, 130 S. E. 343 (1925) the damages for improper construction of a building were declared to be the cost of putting it in proper shape. An
allowance to the owner of damages for defective work and*materials was held
not improper where the owner took possession and gave the contractor notice
of the defects. N. Y. Indemnity v. Hurst, 252 Ky. 59, 66 S. W. 2d 8 (1933).
27. Jacob & Young v. Kent, supra, See Note 23 A. L. R. 1438.
28. Morgan v. Gamble, supra, where the builder completely omitted flue linings as called for by the contract and did not install lead water pipes as the
contract required, the omission was held to be intentional and the owner was
allowed to recover the amount of conforming the work to the contract even
though a substantial part of the work had to be done over.
29. Smedley v. Walden, 246 Mass. 393, 141 N. E. 281 (1923).
30. 9 Am. Jur. 40.
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his silence in the matter may constitute an implied acceptance of such
defect, thereby waiving any objection to it. The result is different
where the defect is latent and the owner has no knowledge of the
defect. In the latter situation if the defect shows up later the owner
may recover damages even though he has already paid for the building.s' Where the owner of a hotel gave notice to the contractor of
the defects therein and moved into the building such a taking was
held not to be an acceptance or waiver of the defects 3 2 In a similar
case where the owner moved into a house the court held that the
use of the house is not a waiver o objection to defects nor does such
use constitute an acceptanceP In Leonard v. Atkiison, a South
Carolina case, the court held that occupancy and use of a building
could not be held to be an acceptance as a matter of law, but is a
question of fact to be determined by the jury, whether under all
circumstances, entrance into and occupancy of a building constitute
an acceptance of the performance.S4
COxc.uslOx

In South Carolina where a builder sues on contract for the price
agreed upon, alleging that he has substantially performed his contract, he may recover the contract price, but the recovery is subject
to recoupment of such damages to the owner as were occasioned by
the defects in the performance of the builder.3 5 But in considering
whether such a recovery should be allowed the courts would in all
probability follow the New York view, which weighs the purpose
to be served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for the deviation
from the letter of the contract, and the cruelty of adherence to it.3 6
The South Carolina court has held that the question of whether occupancy and use of a building denote an acceptance of the defective
performance is one that must be decided by the jury since it may be
determined only by considering the surrounding facts concerning the
occupancy.3 7 The measure of damages to be allowed an owner in
suits under substantial performance has not been decided in South
Carolina but generally the better view is as hereinafter stated. The
damages that should be allowed to the counterclaiming owner when he
is being sued for the remainder of the contract price on a builder's
31. 9 Am. Jur.39.

32. N. Y. Indemnity v. Hurst, sazpra.
33. Morford v. Mastin, 6 T. B. Monroe 609, 17 Am. Dec. 168 (Ky. 1828).
34. Leonard v. Atkinson, 133 S. C. 249, 130 S. E. 755 (1925).
35. Leonard v. Peoples Tobacco Warehouse Co., supra36. Jacob & Young v. Kent supra.
37. Leonard v. Atkinson, supmz.
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contract and the builder is alleging substantial performance, should
be as follows:
1. If the defects are remedial without doing a major part of the
work over, the owner's damages should be the amount reasonably

necessary to conform the work to the contract.
2. If the defects are of such a nature as would necessitate the
destruction of a substantial portion of the building in order to rectify
the defect, the owner's damages should be the difference in value
between the building as it is and as it would have been had it conformed to the contract.
3. If the defects are found to be the result of an intentional omission or departure from the letter of the contract, the owner's damages
should be the amount necessary to conform the work to the contract.
PITMR
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